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Abstract 
 
In this paper we address the issue of finding efficient partial equilibria in markets with non-
convexities. This is a problem that has intrigued generation of economists. Beside its theoretical 
importance this issue is fundamental in energy markets which do not give the right price signals  
and incentives to maintain existing and invest in new generating capacity. By considering a 
competitive environment in which consumers maximize utility independently of other agents 
actions while suppliers are profit maximizers given other market agents actions, we are able to 
find efficient prices in markets with non-convexities. Based on this result we propose a design for 
an energy-only market able to give investors the correct price signals. 
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1 Introduction
Finding clearing prices and quantities in markets with non-convexities is
enjoying a renewed popularity thanks to the deregulation of the electricity
sector in many countries which has brought forth classical market mecha-
nisms for the efficient allocation of demand/supply. In particular, energy
markets have been designed under the assumptions of perfect competition
and operated accordingly. Regardless of the specific implementation and
operative procedures, all energy markets are characterized by a day-ahead
(and/or a hour-ahead) market mechanism. There, suppliers and demanders
bid their respective schedules for the next day (and/or hour) and a market
maker set clearing prices and quantities. The market mechanism can be
as simple as intersecting the energy supply curve with the demand curve
or as complex as finding the dual prices (nodal prices) of an optimization
program which keeps in account, beside bids, all operative and network
constraints. After many years of operation, though, there is an increas-
ing evidence and corresponding policymakers concern that wholesale energy
markets (regardless of the chosen market design) are not providing enough
economic incentives to stimulate investments in new generating capacity nor
in existing one. This problem is known in the literature and in specialized
journals and circles as the ”resource adequacy problem”, the ”supply se-
curity problem” or as the ”missing money problem” since the main issue
really is that energy prices are not high enough to cover investments costs.
Many authors have been investigating the phenomenon, providing both pos-
sible explanations of its causes and ingenious market designs to cope with
it. For example, Hogan, [21], and partially Cramton and Stoft, [11], claim
that the missing money phenomenon is caused by the price caps imposed
by regulators to mitigate market power while Joskow, [24], notes that price
caps are usually not even binding in most U.S. wholesale energy markets
that exhibit ”missing money”. Citing Joskow, [24], ”Even during scarcity
hours market prices are below the price caps. Accordingly, it is unlikely that
the price cap are the only source of the missing money problem”. Joskow,
[24], and Joskow and Tirole, [23], support the view that prices are kept
low during scarcity hours by some hidden system operator behavior and
protocols, e.g., system voltage reduction, out of market contracts (OOM),
reliability must run (RMR). On the other hand all these authors recognize
that lack of demand response and the impossibility to route electricity flow
to single customers are the primary reason for system operator protocols.
In the end all authors agree that generators need to receive more from the
market, or through energy-only high enough payments, [21], or through no
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capped energy spot market combined with forward capacity market, [11]
and [24]. From a more theoretical standpoint most of the work for finding
efficient prices in energy markets has concentrated on two-part tariffs or
in the pricing of different ”commodities” like operative reserve and capac-
ity. Non linear pricing as been well researched, see [36] for a comprehensive
analysis, but it has always been considered appropriate only in not per-
fectly competitive market environments. More recently, O’Neill et al., [28],
have applied non linear pricing in a competitive market environment (with
a special focus to energy market) by explicitly pricing non convexities as it
were different types of commodities. The ”missing money phenomenon” in
the energy industry, though, is not a new problem in the economic litera-
ture. It was first analyzed and brightly solved by the French marginalist
school, in particular by Boiteux, [7], executive at EDF,1 the French na-
tionalized electricity utility. See Dre´ze, [15], for a very good review of the
contributions of French economists to theory and public policy. Because of
the industry cost structure, characterized by large fixed costs and relatively
smaller variable costs, marginal pricing is not enough to guarantee recovery
of total costs, even in a regulated monopoly. The above mentioned author
proved that, when capacity is tight, i.e., at peak load, marginal price has
to increase by the capacity cost per unit of the marginal capacity in order
to recover total costs. Peak load pricing is quite easy to implement in a
centrally managed, regulated industry but it has not found yet the proper
adaptation in a competitive market framework. This is because it has been
widely believed that no efficient clearing price will exists in a competitive
market in the presence of non convexities either in the cost functions or in
the production sets. After the seminal work of Arrow and Debrew, [5], who
have proved the existence of competitive equilibrium prices for a general eco-
nomic system under convexity assumptions (and, hence, excluding the most
common situation of increasing return of scale), the problem has been am-
ply studied by economists who have derived quite interesting results under
the most diverse economic settings, principles and mathematical hypothesis.
We should remind here the work of Guesnerie,[19], who characterizes Pareto
optimality in non convex economies, of Beato, [6], who discusses the exis-
tence of equilibria under marginal cost pricing in differentiable economies
displaying increasing return of scale, Brown et al., [8], who generalize some
of these results, and of Dehez and Dre´ze, [12], who have proved the ex-
istence of general competitive equilibria in the non convex case under the
assumption of voluntary trading: ”... producers announce prices for their
1Electricite´ de France
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outputs and satisfy the demand which materialize at these price ...”. Their
approach is based on objecting the neoclassical assumption that firms max-
imize profit at given price: they, instead, turn over the assumption and
introduce the notion of quantity-takers suppliers. This is in line with the
”Critique of Principles” of Neoclassical theory, started around 1925 with
Sraffa, [33], [34]. He disputed that the long term cost functions can have
the usual U -shape under the classical assumption of perfect competition.
The ”Critique” continued afterwards with the empirical work of Hall and
Hitch, [20]. They analyzed businessmen behavior and concluded that busi-
nessmen are not maximizing profits as the neoclassical theory dictates but
they are more concerned about full cost and what they can actually sell on
the market. The theory of full cost pricing will be developed afterwards
by Andrews, [1], [2], [3],[4], Sylos Labini, [35], Edwards, [17], Kalecki, [25],
Eichner, [18], Moss, [27] and others. For these authors prices are deter-
mined by the production cost under normal utilization of the plants plus
a mark-up. Even those that support the idea that profit maximization is
the firm goal, do recognize that there are some inconsistency within the
neoclassical theory. ”...In particular, long run profit maximization does no
imply, in general, equality between short run marginal cost and marginal
revenue, [37]. This issue was discussed at length in the Oxford Economic
Papers, between 1954 and 1956, by authors like H. F. Lydall, M. E. Paul,
J. Hicks, P. Streeten, F. H. Hahn, H. R. Edwards. Building on all these
contributions we too mildly criticize the neoclassical assumptions underling
the perfectly competitive market model, in particular, the assumption that
agents maximize their own utility without any consideration of other agents
actions. A simple example, reported in the next section, shows that this
assumption will lead to no market equilibrium even in very simple cases.
In fact, Arrow and Debrew, [5], in order to prove the existence of an equi-
librium for the convex case, do need to assume that some agents (in their
case, consumers) actions depend on other agents actions. In this paper we
use the definition of an abstract economy as in [5] but, instead of assuming
that consumers maximize utility given producers choices (which determine
after all consumer available budget) while producers maximize profit subject
only to their own technological constraints, we turn around the hypothesis
and assume that consumers maximize utility independently of other agents,
under an exogenously determined budget, while producers maximize profit
under their own technological (and financial) constraints given other agents
actions. In particular, the aggregate production of other firms combined
with the level of market demand characterize the demand faced by each
firm. In our view this assumption more closely represents real economic
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systems where the number of consumers is much larger than the number of
firms which, in the end, need to take into account both the level of market
demand and other agents cost structure and production possibilities. This
approach can be seen as analogous to searching for supply constrained equi-
libria or underemployment equilibria, a well researched topic in economic
literature, see Roberts, [30], Dehez and Dre´ze, [14], Citanna et al., [10].
Also, in the partial equilibrium setting (which is of the most importance to
us because of our application to energy markets) it is standard to assume
consumers budget exogenously given. Under this framework, by describ-
ing suppliers production sets via a cost function (not necessarily convex)
and a compact set (non necessarily convex) of possible production outputs,
we are able to prove not only the existence of Pareto efficient equilibrium
prices but also to provide a method for computing them. We will apply
our findings to the energy industry and sketch an efficient market design
for an energy-only market able to restore the ”missing money”. This is, by
necessity, not to make the paper unduly long and unreadable, just a sketch
for a possible energy market design which does not take into account all the
operative constraints of a real setting. Also, we should mention here the
fact that our efficiency result depends on the market maker collecting all
relevant and truthful information from the participants, in particular each
producer’s cost structure. Hence, the market maker need to have perfect
information to achieve efficiency, a result in line with Hurwicz findings, [22],
and this delineates the difficulty of the underlying problem and the limits
(to efficiency) implied by current, implemented schemes. We will discuss at
length all these issues in our forthcoming paper. We will leave to future re-
search the issue of finding equilibrium prices for even more general economic
models. The paper is organized as follows: in the next section we briefly re-
mind the neoclassical assumptions underlying competitive markets and give
a simple example that shows how, even under the best of circumstances, a
market equilibrium may fail to exists if all agents act independently of each
other. Then we define a competitive economy in which the set of strategies
available to some agents, particularly producers, is affected by other agents
choices. At this point we are able to prove the existence of efficient, partial
equilibria in markets with non convexities, both in the short and in the long
run and to give algorithms to actually compute them. By a simple argument
these results can also be applied to find equilibrium prices in multiple mar-
kets with independent demands where suppliers are producing all or some
of the commodities. In the last section we show, through examples taken
from the literature, how to apply these theoretical results to real markets,
in particular energy markets, and propose an efficient energy-only market
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design able to restore the missing money in a competitive way.
2 The perfectly competitive market model
Perfect competition is an idealized economic model whose main feature is
that of no market power i.e., where no single economic agent has the power to
influence the price through its behavior and where collusion is not possible.
This situation is summed up by saying that all agents are price takers. This
fundamental requirement is coupled with the following other assumptions
that, all together, define the competitive market model, as introduced by
Cournot and developed by neoclassical economists:
1. No market power: agents are price takers
2. Homogeneity: all producers (supply agents) sell a homogeneous prod-
uct or service
3. Equal access: all firms have access to all available production tech-
nologies and resources
4. No barriers: all agents can enter and exit the market as they wish
5. Perfect information: all agents have complete and symmetric informa-
tion
The behavior of each agent is that of maximizing its own utility, that, for
firms, coincide with profit. In the classical setting, agents are assumed to
behave independently of others so that their decision to produce and/or con-
sume depends solely by the given market price and by their own production
and budget constraints. Given the price, total supply equals the sum of
each producer supply and total demand equals the sum of each consumer
demand. The market or equilibrium price is, by definition, the price at
which total supply equals total demand. The first thing we should notice
is that, in the short run, when the technology of each firm (and hence its
capacity) is fixed by definition, these assumptions are not enough to assure
the existence of an equilibrium even in the convex case. Suppose, in fact,
that we have a finite number of technologies, let say k and, within each, a
finite and large number of identical firms, ni for i = {1, . . . , k}. Suppose
that each firm within technology i can produce any amount between 0 and
its maximum capacity mi (convex production set) and that each firm has a
linear (hence convex) cost function Fi + ciqi defined by a fixed cost Fi and
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a constant marginal cost ci. Given the market price p∗, the firm will solve
the following optimization problem:
Max Π(qi) = p∗qi − ciqi − Fi = (p∗ − ci)qi − Fi
s.t.
0 ≤ qi ≤ mi
whose solution is as follow:
qi = 0 if p∗ ≤ ci
qi = mi if p∗ > ci
When p∗ = ci all points in the production interval will give the same result,
namely, a loss equal to the fixed cost and, hence, the firm may well not
produce at all. Without loss of generality, let’s assume that c1 ≤ c2,≤ . . . ,≤
ck. Given a price p∗, total supply will be equal to S =
∑h
j=1 njmj where
h = max{i/ci < p∗}. The market supply function will be a discontinuous
function with a finite number of vertical pieces as shown in figure.
Hence, the intersection between the demand curve and the supply curve may
fail to occur, as in the next picture.
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The next Theorem gives a sufficient condition for the existence and unique-
ness of a (partial) market equilibrium.
Theorem 2.1 Let S(p) be the market supply as a function of the price and
D(p) the market demand as a function of the price. Let pˆ be the minimum
price at which the firms will supply the market, i.e., S(pˆ−α) = 0 for all α >
0. If S(pˆ) ≤ D(pˆ), S(p) is a continuous, non decreasing function of the price,
D(p) is a continuous, strictly decreasing function of the price then it exists a
unique market equilibrium. Similarly, if S(pˆ) ≤ D(pˆ), S(p) is a continuous,
strictly increasing function of the price, D(p) is a continuous, non increasing
function of the price then it exists a unique market equilibrium.
The above theorem is the underlying reason why so much economic liter-
ature has focused on proving that, indeed, demand and supply curve have
this shape in most markets. If, actually, this is the case for the demand
function, we can not say the same for the supply function as the previous
simple example proves. In order to assure the existence of an equilibrium
point in a competitive market without making restrictive assumptions about
cost functions and supply curves we need to drop the unrealistic assumption
that in a competitive market all agents maximize utility without any con-
sideration of other agents behavior. At least some of them need to take into
consideration others agents behavior. This is actually what Arrow and De-
breu needed to assume in their famous work Existence of an Equilibrium for
a Competitive Economy. In this work, they generalize the notion of a game
and define an abstract economy with l products and r agents as follows:
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Definition 2.2 An Abstract Economy is the tuple
E = (Ω1,Ω2, . . . ,Ωr, f1, f2, . . . , fr, A1(a1), . . . , Ar(ar)) where Ωi ⊆ Rl,
Ω = Ω1 × Ω2 × . . .× Ωr, Ωi = (Ω1 × Ω2 × . . .× Ωi−1 × Ωi+1 × . . .× Ωr), fi
is a real function defined over Ω, fi : Ω→ R, while Ai(ai) is a multi-valued
function defined over Ωi whose values are subsets of Ωi, Ai : Ωi → ℘(Ωi),
i.e., Ai associates to any (r − 1)-tuple in Ωi a subset in Ωi.
This definition can be seen as a generalization of a game in which r individ-
uals, upon choosing a strategy, resulting in a strategy profile (aˆ1, . . . , aˆr),
such that aˆi ∈ Ai(aˆ1, . . . aˆi−1, aˆi+1, . . . aˆr) for all i, i.e., aˆi belongs to the
set of available action to player i, will receive the payoff fi(aˆ1, . . . , aˆr). The
difference with a standard game is that in this latter the set of available
strategies to each player is independent of other players choices. Hence, in
an abstract economy, the choice of an agent affects both the payoff and the
feasible set of actions of other players. It is, then, only natural to define an
equilibrium for an abstract economy E as:
Definition 2.3 An equilibrium for an abstract economy is a r−tuple
(a∗1, a∗2, . . . , a∗r) such that a∗i ∈ Ai(a∗i ) and fi(a∗i , a∗i ) = maxai∈Ai(a∗i )fi(a∗i , ai).
An economic equilibrium is characterized by the fact that each agent is
maximizing its own utility given the actions of other agents. These other
agents actions may or may not affect the feasible set of actions available
to a given agent. In the same fundamental work, [5], Arrow and Debreu
define an abstract economy in which l commodities are traded and agents
are divided among consumers, producers and a fictitious agent, called the
market participant or market maker who chooses prices and whose behavior
reflects the law of supply and demand, i.e., the price of a commodity rises
if demand exceeds supply and falls otherwise. The payoff to a consumer is
given by its utility function, to a firm by its profit and to the market maker
by balancing demand and supply in all markets. Consumers and market
maker available actions do depend on other agents actions while producers
available actions are assumed to be independent by other agents actions.
It is then proved that, under suitable assumptions, among which there is,
remarkably, the assumption of non-increasing return of scale, an equilibrium
exists. We will follow track, but instead of assuming that consumers set of
actions depends on other agents actions we will assume that consumers act
independently while the set of actions available to each producer does depend
on other agents actions. In particular, the demand faced by each firm does
depend on overall market demand and other firms aggregate production.
The assumption in this terms seems just obvious.
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In the next section we will address the existence of an equilibrium for an
abstract economy where a single commodity is traded (partial equilibrium)
and where increasing return of scale and in general, non convexities, are
present. We will explore both the single and multi period setting (short and
long run).
3 Partial Equilibria in Competitive Markets with
Non Convexities
Let us consider a competitive market with the following features:
1. Homogeneity: all producers (supply agents) sell a homogeneous prod-
uct or service.
2. No market power and no collusion : agents are price takers.
3. Equal access: all firms have access to all available production tech-
nologies and resources.
4. Perfect information: all agents have complete and symmetric informa-
tion.
5. No barriers: all agents can enter and exit the market as they wish. In
particular, firms will exit the market if they are not making at least the
normal profit in a given time horizon and they will enter the market
if they can make at least the normal profit in a given time horizon.
Firms staying in the market for a given time period can decide not
to produce at any point in time: they will always do so if the market
price at a given time is such that revenues do not cover their variable
costs.
6. Consumers maximize their own utility independently of all other agents
subject only to their own budget constraint. Each firm maximizes his
own utility, in the face of a firm’s demand that depends on market
demand as well as on other firms aggregate production, (i.e., produc-
ers are maximizers, given other agents actions), subject to their own
production (technological) and budget (financial) constraints.
We will distinguish two cases: in the first case there is a single period,
within which all firms need to achieve the normal profit or will not enter the
market; in the second case the given time horizon T is divided in t periods.
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The problem is then that of finding equilibrium prices (p∗1, p∗2, . . . , p∗t ) that
equates supply and demand in each period and such that each firm will earn
the normal profit within the given time horizon T .
3.1 The Single Period
1. Consumers. There are m consumers, each with a utility function ui :
R+ → R and with a given budget Bi. At a given price p∗, each
consumer, independently of all others agents, will ask the quantity d∗i
which solves the following optimization problem:
max ui(d)
s.t.
d ∈ Xi(p∗)
where Xi(p∗) is the feasible set at price p∗ for consumer i, Xi(p∗) =
{d ≥ 0 : p∗d ≤ Bi}.
Note that, at the given price p∗, the total demand is D(p∗) =
∑m
i=1 d
∗
i .
2. Technologies. We assume there are k different technologies that can
produce the same homogenous output and whose cost structure is
given by cost functions Ci(q) for q ∈ Ki ⊆ R+ (Ki is the production
possibility set of technology i and it is any subset of the non negative
real numbers). Ci(q) is by definition the minimum cost at which the
amount q can be efficiently produced by technology i. Without loss of
generality we can assume that Ci(q) = CFi + C
V
i (q) where C
F
i ≥ 0 is
the fixed cost, incurred independently of the amount produced, while
CVi is the variable costs that, instead, does depend on the amount
produced. Within technology i there are, potentially, ni equal firms,
where ni is a large number, modelling no barrier to entry. Not all
these firms need to be active at equilibrium, modelling no barrier to
exit. At equilibrium, we will have the optimal number n∗i of firms
within technology i. Actually, we can also use this same framework to
model the short run when the number of firms ni is fixed. In this case
the maximum capacity of technology i is nimi, its fixed costs is CFi =
riC
F
i , where ri ≤ ni is the number of active firms, and its variable cost
is CV (Q) = riCV (Qri ). In order to simplify notation, in what follows
we will be referring to technologies, keeping in mind, though, that
a supplier should be a firm j within technology i. We will indicate
by K˜i the production possibility set of technology i as a whole. Each
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technology will maximize its own profit subject to its own technological
and financial constraints and by facing a technology demand which
depends by market demand (i.e. consumers preferences) and by the
aggregate production of other technologies, i.e., depends by others
agents actions. In particular, a technology will produce nothing if it
can not achieve at least the normal profit.
3. Market Maker. There is a market maker which set the price and whose
goal is to equate supply and demand in such a way to achieve Pareto
efficiency given other players actions.
Our market economy can be defined as:
E = (R+, R+1 , . . . , R
+
m, R
+
1 , . . . , R
+
k , u1, . . . , um,Π1, . . . ,Πk,
X1(a1) . . . , Xm(am), A1(a1), . . . , Ak(ak))
where R+ is the set of non negative real numbers. The first component rep-
resents the price (and hence the market maker), the following components
from 1 to m represent the demand of each consumer, the following compo-
nents from 1 to k represent the supply of each technology. ui is the utility
function of consumer i and depends solely by its own demand di:
ui(p, d1, . . . , dm, Q1, . . . , Qk) = ui(di)
Πj is the profit of technology j and depends only by the price and its own
produced quantity (and its own cost structure):
Πj(p, d1, . . . , dm, Q1, . . . , Qm) = Π(p,Qj)
Xi is the available set of consumption pattern to consumer i and depends
solely by the price (and consumer i budget):
Xi(p, d1, . . . , di−1, di+1, . . . , Q1, . . . , Qk) = {d ≥ 0 : pd ≤ Bi}
Finally, Aj represents the available set of production levels for technology j
and does depend on all other agents actions (as well by its own technological
and financial constraints):
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Aj(p, d1, . . . , dm, Q1, . . . , Qj−1, Qj+1, . . . , Qk) =
{Q > 0 : Q ≤
m∑
i=1
di −
∑
l 6=j
Ql, Q ∈ K˜j ,Πj = pQ− CT (Q) ≥ 0} ∪ {0}
Any (non zero) element in Aj(.) is the portion of ”residual” demand, given
other agents actions, that technology j can satisfy under its own constraints.
If the residual demand is zero, i.e., other agents are already fulfilling all
market demand, the only available strategy for the agent is not producing.
At the given price p∗ technology i is solving the following problem:
Max Πi(p∗;Qi)
s.t.
Qi ∈ Ai(Qi)
Definition 3.1 An equilibrium in our competitive market is a vector
(p∗, d∗1, . . . , d∗m, Q∗1, . . . , Q∗k) such that
1. p∗ ≥ 0
2.
∑m
i=1 d
∗
i =
∑k
i=1Q
∗
i
3. d∗i ∈ Xi(d∗i ) = Xi(p∗) and ui(d∗) = maxd∈Xi(p∗)u(d) for all i =
{1, . . .m}
4. Q∗j ∈ Aj(Q∗j ) and Π(Q∗j ) = maxQ∈Aj(Q∗j )Π(Q) for all j = {1, . . . k}
A competitive partial equilibrium, hence, gives a price that equates supply
and demand and such that consumers are maximizing utility under bud-
get constraint and producers are maximizing profits under production and
financial constraints given other agents actions. The definition does not ex-
clude multiple equilibria. We are looking for Pareto (or otherwise efficient)
equilibria. First, we will consider the case in which all suppliers have non
increasing average total cost functions and then we generalize our findings
to include general cost functions. Next, we will describe an optimization
problem whose solution, under some assumption, will give a Pareto efficient
equilibrium. Consider the following optimization problem P :
max
∫ Q
0
D−1(x)d(x)−
k∑
i=1
ni∑
j=1
CTij(qij)zij
s.t.
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Q =
k∑
i=1
ni∑
j=1
qij (1)
p = D−1(Q) (2)
pqij − CTij(qij)zij ≥ 0 ∀ i = {1, . . . , k}, ∀ j = {1, . . . , ni} (3)
qij ∈ Ki ∀ i = {1, . . . , k}, ∀ j = {1, . . . , ni} (4)
qij ≤ Mzij ∀ i = {1, . . . , k}, ∀ j = {1, . . . , ni} (5)
zij ∈ {0, 1} ∀ i = {1, . . . , k}, ∀ j = {1, . . . , ni} (6)
p ≥ 0 (7)
where
• D−1(Q) is the market demand inverse function. By definition, the
market demand is the locus of points such that consumers are maxi-
mizing their own utility (under budget constraints) at given prices.
• CTij(qij) = CTi (qij) is the total cost of supplying qij units of product by
using technology i incurred by firm j. It includes fixed costs, if any.
• Ki is the feasible production set for technology i. Since it is always
feasible not to produce, 0 ∈ Ki for all i.
• zij are decision variable that can take only {0, 1} values. If zij is set to
zero, the corresponding firm j adopting technology i will not produce
and it may or may not incur its fixed cost: this will depend on the
type of problem we are modelling. If it is an investment decision then
a non-active firm will not incur its fixed cost; if, though, fixed costs are
already sunk the firm will incur its fixed costs. In either case, the cost
of non active firms is not reflected, rightly, in the market allocation
cost. If zij is set to 1 it will produce an amount such that at the market
price of our single period model its revenues will be greater or equal
to its total costs. This profitability requirement is expressed through
constraint (3).
• Constraint (4) just express technological feasibility of production. Taken
together, constraints (3) and (4) represents each firm financial and
technological constraints.
• Constraint (5) is needed to force production qij to be zero at firm j
adopting technology i if the corresponding decision variable zij = 0.
M is a large number. It is enough to take this number equal to the
maximum capacity among the technologies.
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• Constraints (1) and (2) equates total demand and total supply at a
given price p.
• The objective function is just the sum of each player utility function
since
∫ Q
0 D
−1(x)d(x) = Consumer surplus + Total Market Revenue
= Consumers surplus + pQ and the term
∑k
i=1
∑ni
j=1C
T
ij(qij)zij is the
total cost of supplying Q amount of product to the market. Hence, the
objective function can be read as Consumers surplus+ Total Market
Profit i.e., the usual Welfare Function.
Here ni is a large number for each i, representing no barrier to entry and exit
the market. The optimal solution to problem P will, hence, give the optimal
number of firms within each technology. Note that if an optimal solution to
the foregoing optimization exists then there exists another optimal solution
where qij = qil for j, l ∈ {1, . . . , ni} and for any technology i. Hence, w.l.g.
we will assume throughout this paper that the optimal solution of problem
P is of this latter form.
Theorem 3.2 If the utility function of each consumer, ui(q), is such that
ui(q) < ui(q+k) for any positive k > 0, the market demand strictly decrease
for any price increase and each producer j has non increasing average total
cost then, if a solution of the problem P exists, it is a Pareto efficient solution
for the competitive market described by assumption 1− 6.
Proof. Let us suppose that an optimal solution S∗ = (p∗, Q∗, q∗11, q∗12, . . . q∗knk)
to the foregoing optimization problem exists. It is equivalent to S˜∗ =
(p∗, d∗1, . . . , d∗m, q∗11, q∗12, . . . q∗knk) where u(d
∗
i ) = max{ui(d) : d ∈ Xi(p∗)}
since by definition of market demand
∑m
i=1 d
∗
i = D(p
∗) = Q∗. Let us
prove that the solution is indeed Pareto optimal for the game at hand.
By contradiction, suppose that there exists another output of the game,
Sˆ = (pˆ, dˆ1, . . . , dˆm, qˆ11, . . . qˆknk), where
∑m
i=1 dˆi =
∑
(ij) qˆij = Qˆ and pˆ =
D−1(Qˆ), such that all agents are not worse off than in S∗ and at least one
agents is strictly better off. Let us call by A∗ = {(ij)/z∗ij = 1} i.e., A∗ is the
set of all firms that are supplying the market according to solution S∗. If
pˆ > p∗ then by our assumption about market demand we have that Qˆ < Q∗
and hence some consumer needs to cut off his/her consumption and he/she
will be definitely worse off than in solution S∗ because of the non saturation
hypothesis. Hence, pˆ ≤ p∗. Suppose that pˆ < p∗. It follows that Qˆ > Q∗ and
consumer surplus strictly increases. If Market profit strictly decreases than
in S∗, i.e.,
∑
(ij) Π(pˆ; qˆij) <
∑
(ij) Π(p
∗; q∗ij) then some agent in A
∗ is defi-
nitely worse off in Sˆ than in S∗. If, instead,
∑
(ij) Π(pˆ; qˆij) ≥
∑
(ij) Π(p
∗; q∗ij)
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then some constraint of problem P must be violated by Sˆ, namely constraint
3 or 4, otherwise S∗ would not be the optimal solution to problem P . If
constraint 4 is violated then the allocation in Sˆ is not physically feasible
and should be discarded. Suppose, hence, that solution Sˆ is violating only
constraint 3 i.e., the firms financial constraint. It must be, though, that
the financial constraint is violated only for firms outside the set A∗. In
fact, Π(pˆ; qˆij) ≥ Π(p∗; q∗ij) ≥ 0 for all (ij) ∈ A∗ since, otherwise, some of
these firms is definitely better off with output S∗. This in turn implies that
qˆij > q
∗
ij for all (ij) ∈ A∗ since pˆ < p∗ and average total cost is non increas-
ing in quantity. To see why this must be the case, suppose that qˆij < q∗ij .
From Π(pˆ; qˆij) ≥ Π(p∗; q∗ij) ≥ 0 it follows that
pˆqˆij − CAT (qˆij)qˆij
qˆij
>
pˆqˆij − CAT (qˆij)qˆij
q∗ij
≥ p
∗q∗ij − CAT (q∗ij)q∗ij
q∗ij
and, hence, pˆ−CAT (qˆij) > p∗−CAT (q∗ij) which implies CAT (qˆij) < CAT (q∗ij)
against our hypothesis on average total costs. Finally, it is easy to see that
can not be qˆij = q∗ij . Hence
∑
(ij)∈A∗ qˆij >
∑
(ij)∈A∗ q
∗
ij = Q
∗. The point
S = (p,Q, q11, . . . , qknk) where Q =
∑
(ij)∈A∗ qˆij , p = D
−1(Q), qij = qˆij for
all (ij) ∈ A∗ and qij = 0 otherwise, is feasible to problem P since Π(p; qij) =
pqˆij − CTij(qˆj) ≥ pˆqˆij − CTij(qˆj) = Π(pˆ; qˆij) ≥ Π(p∗; q∗ij) ≥ 0 for all (ij) ∈ A∗
since Q ≤ Qˆ and hence p ≥ pˆ. Moreover, S has an objective value strictly
better than S∗ since Q > Q∗ implying p < p∗ implying further a strictly
higher consumer surplus than in S∗ and
∑
ij Π(p; qij) =
∑
(ij)∈A∗ Π(p; qˆij) ≥∑
(ij)∈A∗ Π(p
∗; q∗ij) =
∑
ij Π(p
∗; q∗ij). This contradicts the fact that S
∗ was
the optimal solution to problem P . Finally, if pˆ = p∗ then Qˆ = Q∗ and from
the above it follows that qˆij = q∗ij for all (ij) ∈ A∗ and hence S∗ = Sˆ.
Lemma 3.3 Let us assume that each supplier total cost function is differ-
entiable in the interior of the supplier production set and that there exist left
and right derivatives at the boundary points.
Let S∗ = (p∗, d∗1, . . . , d∗m, q∗11, q∗12, . . . q∗tnk) be an optimal solution to problem
P and let A∗ be the set of active suppliers at this optimal solution. If p∗ ≥
max{C ′i(q) : q ∈ Ai(q∗ij)} for all (ij) ∈ A∗ then S∗ is an equilibrium for the
competitive market described by assumption 1− 6.
Proof. The result follows by noting that, under the hypothesis, is p∗(qij +
h) − CT (qij + h) ≥ p∗qij − CT (qij) for any qij ∈ Ai(q∗ij) and any (ij) ∈
A∗ and, hence, each supplier optimal action is to fulfill the whole residual
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demand, i.e., q∗ij =
∑m
i=1 d
∗
i −
∑k
t=1
∑nt
l=1 q
∗
tl with (tl) 6= (ij), is such that
Π(q∗ij) = max{Π(q) : q ∈ Aij(q∗ij)}.
We also have the following necessary condition for equilibria:
Lemma 3.4 Let us assume that suppliers cost function are differentiable in
the interior of their production set. If S∗ = (p∗, d∗1, . . . , d∗m, q∗11, q∗12, . . . q∗knk)
is an equilibrium for the competitive market described by assumption 1 − 6
then p∗ ≥ C ′i(q∗ij) for all active suppliers such that q∗ij is interior to the
production set.
Proof. The result immediately follows since, otherwise, q∗ij would not be a
maximization point given other agents actions.
Theorem 3.5 Under the assumption of Theorem (3.2), if an optimal so-
lution to problem P exists then it is a Pareto efficient equilibrium for the
competitive market described by assumption 1− 6.
Proof. By the Theorem (3.2) if a solution to problem P exists then it is
Pareto efficient. Let us prove that it is indeed a market equilibrium as de-
fined by (3.1). Conditions 1, 2, 3 are satisfied through constraints (7),(1),(2).
Given other players actions, each firm is maximizing profit over the set of its
available strategies since, by hypothesis, total average cost function is not
increasing and, hence, the corresponding marginal cost function is below it
and by Lemma (3.3) the result follows.
The problem P will usually have a solution. In the next theorem we will
give sufficient conditions, usually met in real life situation, for a solution
to exists. These conditions require basically that the market price can rise
high enough if supply is scarce, that total capacity is finite and that it exists
a single firm that could act as a monopolist or, in more simple terms, that
can supply at some market price pˆ the corresponding quantity D(pˆ) without
incurring losses. As one can see, if this last condition is not satisfied there
can not be any market whatsoever.
Theorem 3.6 Suppose that the demand function is continuous as well as
each supplier total cost function. Suppose further that each technology set,
Ki, is compact and that limq→1+ D−1(q) = +∞. If it exists a single firm
that can supply an amount qˆ ∈ Ki such that pˆ = D−1(qˆ) ≥ CAT (qˆ) then a
solution to problem P exists.
Proof. Under the hypothesis, problem P feasible set is not empty. Let us
consider the price pˆ = maxi{maxq∈KiCATi (q)} where CATi (q) is the aver-
age total cost function of technology i. At price pˆ all firms will supply any
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amount so that the equilibrium price is surely less or equal than pˆ. Hence,
w.l.g., we can bound the price by pˆ to obtain a bounded feasible set. For
each possible combination of active (zij = 1) or non active (zij = 0) suppli-
ers we get a continuous objective function and an empty or a non empty,
compact feasible region for which the maximum exists. Since the possible
combinations of active and non active suppliers are finite the result follows.
Let us consider now the following function:
f(Q) = min {
k∑
i=1
ni∑
j=1
CTij(qij)zij s.t. qij ∈ S(Q) for all (ij)}
where S(Q) is the set described by the following system:
Q =
k∑
i=1
ni∑
j=1
qij
p = D−1(Q)
pqij − CTij(qij)zij ≥ 0 ∀ i = {1, . . . , t}, ∀ j = {1, . . . , ni}
qij ∈ Ki ∀ i = {1, . . . , t}, ∀ j = {1, . . . , ni}
qij ≤ Mzij ∀ i = {1, . . . , t}, ∀ j = {1, . . . , ni}
zij ∈ {0, 1} ∀ i = {1, . . . , t}, ∀ j = {1, . . . , ni}
p ≥ 0
It is obvious, then, that a solution to problem P can be found by solving
max F (Q)− f(Q)
where F (Q) =
∫ Q
0 D
−1(x)d(x) and Q is such that f(Q) is defined i.e., its
associated feasible set is non empty. If the function G(Q) = F (Q) − f(Q)
is strictly quasi-concave a simple algorithmic scheme would be to find the
maximum Qˆ such that f(Qˆ) is defined i.e., the maximum Qˆ for which a
feasible allocation of demand Qˆ among suppliers at price p(Qˆ) exists, and
then computing G(Q) for decreasing value of Q ≤ Qˆ till a local optimum is
reached. Dichotomous or Fibonacci search or other smarter search methods
could be used in order to converge faster to the optimum. In most practical
cases, though, when the demand function has the usual, downward sloping,
convex shape and suppliers average total cost functions are non increasing,
the optimal Q∗ will be near the maximal feasible Qˆ.
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The algorithm can be seen as a modified version of the Tatonnement process
for the Walrasian auctioneer.
1. The auctioneer will cry prices in ascending order.
(a) At the given price pˆ, a market demandD(pˆ) will form by summing
the demand of each single consumer.
(b) At the given price pˆ, each producer h will compute its supply set
Sh(pˆ) = {q ∈ Kh : pˆq−CT (q) ≥ 0} and a market supply set S(pˆ)
will form by making the union of all supply sets Sh. Suppliers
will bid their cost function along with their supply sets.
2. The auctioneer will compute a min cost allocation of market demand
D(pˆ) over the supply set S(pˆ) and will then compute total welfare. If
total welfare increases with respect to the previous price the process
is repeated otherwise the process ends.
Under suitable assumption, as we have seen before, the process will converge
to a Pareto efficient equilibrium.
If suppliers average total cost is any function and fixed costs are not already
sunk (as in investment decisions) then we still have a Pareto efficient solu-
tion since suppliers either recover total costs or will not enter the market. If,
though, fixed costs are already sunk we may loose Pareto efficiency. In this
case we could use the concept of Second Best or the Ramsey-Boiteux prices.
The theory of second best refers to situations in which there is some de-
parture from economic efficiency (e.g., taxes, budget constrains, monopoly
power, incomplete markets, etc.) and aims at finding optimal policies that
can cope with this source of inefficiency. The Ramsey-Boiteux prices are the
second best approach to maximize welfare subject to a budget constraint
(usually a zero or no loss constraint) and are usually used in public monop-
olies to avoid financing deficits through taxes. See [7], [16], [32]. Hence, we
may claim that, when suppliers average total cost is any function, a solu-
tion to problem P is second best or constrained Pareto efficient. It may not
be, though, an equilibrium. In order to find efficient equilibria we need to
consider additional constraints. Let us consider the problem P
′
which is the
same as P with the addition of the following constraint:
(p− C ′ij(qij))(qij − lij)zij ≥ 0
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for all (ij)2 where lij is the minimum load3 for technology i. The constraint
imposes the necessary condition that, for active suppliers (zij = 1), equilib-
rium price has to be greater or equal to marginal cost at interior equilibrium
quantity. The condition is also sufficient if supplier marginal cost is quasi-
monotone. We then get the following results:
Corollary 3.7 Let us assume that each supplier total cost function is dif-
ferentiable in the interior of the supplier production set and that there exist
left and right derivatives at the boundary points. Let us assume further that
each supplier cost function is such that either total average cost is not in-
creasing or marginal cost is quasi-monotone. If a solution to problem P
′
exists then it is an equilibrium for the competitive market described by as-
sumption 1−6 and it is second best Pareto efficient with respect to any other
possible equilibrium.
Also, analogous to Theorem (3.6), we get:
Corollary 3.8 Suppose that the demand function is continuous, that
limq→1+ D−1(q) = +∞, that each supplier total cost function is differentiable
in the interior of the supplier production set and that there exist left and
right derivatives at the boundary points. Under the additional hypothesis
that each technology set, Ki, is compact and that there exists a single firm
that can supply an amount qˆ ∈ Ki such that pˆ = D−1(qˆ) ≥ CAT (qˆ) and
(pˆ− C ′i(qˆ)(qˆ − li) ≥ 0 then problem P
′
has a solution.
The Tatonnement process for the Walrasian auctioneer is the same as before
except that now each supplier will bid a supplier set comprised of all the
quantities that are profitable to produce at the cried price and such that
marginal cost at each of these quantity is non greater than the cried price.
Let P ′ be the optimization problem obtained from P
′
by removing the prof-
itability requirement and by adding the following constraint: plij ≥ CV (lij)
whenever qij = lij and lij > 0 is the minimum load of technology i.
max
∫ Q
0
D−1(x)d(x)−
k∑
i=1
ni∑
j=1
CTij(qij)zij
s.t.
2Actually, it is enough to consider only those suppliers whose average total cost is not
non- increasing
3lij can also be zero if technology i can produce any  > 0
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Q =
k∑
i=1
ni∑
j=1
qij (8)
p = D−1(Q) (9)
(plij − CV (lij)zij ≥ (qij − lij)(Neg) zij ∀ i, j, lij > 0 (10)
(p− C ′ij(qij))(qij − lij)zij ≥ 0 ∀ i, j (11)
qij ∈ Ki ∀ i, j (12)
qij ≤ Mzij ∀ i, j (13)
zij ∈ {0, 1} ∀ i, j (14)
Neg is a large, negative number.
Corollary 3.9 Under the assumption of Corollary (3.7), if a solution to
problem P ′ exists then it is an equilibrium and it is Pareto efficient with
respect to any other possible equilibrium.
Corollary 3.10 Under the assumption of Corollary (3.8) a solution to prob-
lem P ′ exists.
3.2 The Multi Period
In this section we analyze the case in which firms need to achieve profit in
a given time horizon of T periods or will not produce in any period. We
can see this as the problem faced by a firm wishing to enter a given market
or as the steady state for already active firms. We will be assuming perfect
and complete information as well as perfect foresight.
1. Consumers. In each period t there are mt consumers with utility
function uti : R
+ → R and an exogenous budget4 Bti which both do
not depend on other periods consumption. Hence, market demand in
each period is independent.
2. Technologies There is a finite number of technologies that may or may
not be present in some period. In the latter case the production possi-
bility set of technology i at time t is empty. This allows to model ob-
solescence of technology and entrance of new technologies. Also, since
4Here we assume that budget in each period does not depend on other period con-
sumption since we are in a partial equilibrium setting and hence budget in period t can
also depend on other markets prices.
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the production possibility set is indexed by time we can model down-
time and other short term change in production possibility as well as
investments in capacity and other long term resources. Hence, we can
model both short and long run equilibria. The cost structure of each
technologies is Ctoti (q1, q2, . . . , qT ) = C
V (q1, q2, . . . , qT ) +
∑T
t=1C
F
ti =
CV (q1, q2, . . . , qT )+CFi . In each period, within technology i, there are
ni equal firms where ni is a large number modelling no barriers. Each
firm is maximizing profits within the time horizon, given other agents
action, with the aim to cover total cost within the time horizon. If this
can not be achieved, firm will not produce in any period. Note that
without this assumption on profitability we just have a competitive
model in which all firms are maximizers given other agents actions.
On the other end, for T large enough, a no-loss requirement seems
just a necessary economic condition.
3. The Market Maker There is a market maker whose goal is to equate
supply and demand in each period and to reach Pareto efficiency given
other players actions.
The market economy in this case is represented by:
1. A vector of prices (p1, . . . pT );
2. A vector of consumer demands (d11, . . . , dTmT ) such that ui(d1i, . . . , dT i) =∑T
t=1 uti(dti) for any consumer i and dti ∈ Xti = {d ≥ 0 : ptd ≤ Bti}
for any consumer i and any period t;
3. A vector of production quantity (q1ij , . . . , qT ij) for any firm (ij) such
that Πij(p1, . . . , pt, d11, . . . , dTmT , q11, . . . , qTn) =∑T
t=1 ptqtij−Ctotij (q1ij , . . . , qT ij) and whereAij(qij) = {(q1ij , . . . , qtij) ≥
0 : qtij ∈ Ktij , qtij ≤ Dt −
∑
(hr)6=(ij) qthr, Πij ≥ 0} ∪ {0}. As usual,
each firm is maximizing profit within the time horizon, given other
agents actions.
Definition 3.11 An equilibrium in this market economy is a vector
(p∗1, . . . , p∗T , d
∗
11, . . . , d
∗
Tm, q
∗
11, . . . , q
∗
Tn)
5 such that
1. (p∗1, . . . , p∗T ) ≥ 0
2.
∑
i d
∗
ti =
∑
j q
∗
tj for all t = {1, . . . T}
5To avoid a too cumbersome notation I have re-indexed variables here
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3. (d∗1i, . . . , d
∗
T i) ∈ Xi(d∗i ) and ui(d∗1i, . . . , d∗T i) = maxd∈Xi(d∗i )ui(d1i, . . . dT i)
for all i
4. (q∗1j , . . . , q
∗
Tj) ∈ Aj(q∗j ) and Π(p∗, q∗j ) = maxqj∈Aj(q∗j )Π(p∗, qj) for all j
We have the following result:
Lemma 3.12 Let us assume that each supplier production set Kij is a
compact set6 and that Cij(q) is of class C1(K˙ij)7. Let S∗ be an equilib-
rium. If q∗tij > ltij (where ltij is the minimum load required by firm (ij)
to produce at time t) then p∗t ≥ ∂Cij∂qtij (q∗1ij , . . . , q∗T ij); if q∗tij = ltij > 0 then
p∗t ≥
CV (q∗1ij ,...,ltij ,...,q
∗
Tij)−CV (q∗1ij ,...,0,...,q∗Tij)
ltij
.
Proof. The result follows since, otherwise, supplier (ij) would find more
convenient, given other agents actions, to reduce production of item qtij (if
q∗tij > ltij) or not producing at all (if q
∗
tij = ltij).
Hence, under the hypothesis of Lemma (3.12), equilibria will be the same if
the set of available actions of each supplier is further restricted by requiring
market price to be higher than partial marginal costs:
Aij(qij) = {0} ∪ {(q1ij , . . . , qtij) ≥ 0 : qtij ∈ Ktij , qtij
≤ Dt −
∑
(hr)6=(ij)
qthr, Πij ≥ 0
 pt ≥
∂Cij
∂qtij
(q1ij , .., qtij , ..qT ij) if qtij > ltij
pt ≥ C
V (q1ij ,..,ltij ,..qTij)−CV (q1ij ,..,0,..,qTij)
ltij
if qtij = ltij > 0
Let us consider the following optimization problem P
′′
:
max
T∑
t=1
∫ Qt
0
D−1t (x)dx−
k∑
i=1
nk∑
j=1
CVij (q1ij , . . . , qT ij)−CFijZij−
T∑
t=1
k∑
i=1
nk∑
j=1
ztij
s.t.
6This is always the case if Ktij are closed intervals of the real line
7K˙ij is the interior of Kij
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Qt =
k∑
i=1
ni∑
j=1
qtij ∀ t = {1, . . . , T} (15)
pt = D−1t (Qt) ∀ t = {1, . . . , T} (16)
qtij ∈ Kti ∀ t, i, j (17)
qtij ≤ Mztij ∀ t, i, j (18)
(pt − ∂Cij
∂qtij
(q1ij , . . . , qT ij))(qtij − ltij)ztij ≥ 0 ∀ t, i, j (19)
(ptltij − CV (.., ltij , ., ) + CV (, ..0, ., ))ztij ≥ (qtij − ltij)Negztij ∀ t, i, j(20)
T∑
t=1
(ptqtij − CVtij(qtij)− CFijZij ≥ 0 ∀ i, j (21)
T∑
t=1
ztij ≤ MZij ∀ i, j (22)
ztij ∈ {0, 1} ∀ t, i, j (23)
Zij ∈ {0, 1} ∀ i, j (24)
pt ≥ 0 ∀ t = {1, . . . , T} (25)
This is a mixed-integer, non-linear program where the binary variable ztij
is used to model activity of firm (ij) at time t, ztij = 1, or non-activity,
ztij = 0. If firm (ij) is active at time t, i.e., qtij > 0, then constraint (18),
where M is a large positive number, will force ztij to be 1. If, though,
qtij = 0 then the term −ztij in the objective function will force ztij to be
zero in an optimal solution since  is a small, positive number chosen small
enough not to modify the optimal solution. The binary variable Zij is used
to model activity, Zij = 1, or no activity, Zij = 0, of firm (ij) during the
entire time horizon. If firm is active in any period, ztij = 1 for some t,
then constraint (22) will force Zij = 1 and the firm fixed cost for the entire
period will be reflected in the welfare function. If the firm (ij) is not active
in any period then the term −CFijZij will force the variable Zij to be zero
in an optimal solution since costs are positive numbers. As already men-
tioned, the objective function is the usual welfare function, i.e., maximizing
the total sum of consumers surplus and firms profit. Constraints (15) and
(16) equate supply and demand while (17) is each firm technological con-
straint on production. Constraints (19) and (20) must be satisfied by all
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equilibria points by lemma (3.12) while constraint (21) imposes the prof-
itability requirement within the given time horizon. Note that constraint
(19) is an identity if zij = 0 or qtij = ltij while forces price to be greater or
equal to partial marginal cost when qtij > ltij . Similarly, constraint (20) is
an identity if ztij = 0 and is redundant if qtij > ltij since Neg is a large,
negative number. When qtij = ltij , instead, the constraint reveals the trade
off between producing at minimum load or not producing at all. Finally,
when Zij = 0 constraint (22) is again the identity 0 = 0 since Zij = 0
implies ztij = 0 for all t which further implies qtij = 0 for all t. As in the
previous section, we could make the distinction between the case of sunk or
non-sunk fixed cost to claim Pareto optimality. However, even if fixed costs
are already sunk, it may still be preferable for the firm not to produce at all
in time horizon T if producing, while recovering part of fixed costs, requires
additional investments to cover operative deficits. From this point of view,
to say that a profitability requirement in a given time horizon, for active
firms, is a departure from economic efficiency is a little stretchy. Moreover,
a profitability assumption is made also in Arrow-Debreu, [5], to prove the
existence of equilibria in a general economy. However, for purists, we keep
the distinction and claim just second best Pareto efficiency when costs are
sunk. We have the following result:
Theorem 3.13 Let us assume that each supplier production set Kij is a
compact set and that Cij(q) is of class C1(K˙ij). Suppose that a solution S∗
to problem P
′′
exists. If ∂Cij∂qtij (q
∗
1ij , . . . , qtij , . . . , q
∗
T ij) is quasi-monotone for
all t and all (ij) then S∗ it is an equilibrium and it is second-best Pareto
efficient among all possible equilibria.
Proof. We have that p∗t ≥ ∂Cij∂qtij (q1ij , . . . , qtij , . . . , qT ij) for all qij ∈ Aij(q∗ij).
Hence, p∗d ≥ ∇Cij(qij)d for all d ≥ 0 and all qij ∈ Aij(q∗ij) which implies
that the optimal action for supplier (ij) is to fulfill all the residual demand
in any market.
Corollary 3.14 Let P
′′′
be the optimization problem obtained from P
′′
by
removing the profitability requirement (constraint 21) and let S∗ be a solution
to problem P
′′′
. Under the hypothesis of Theorem (3.13) S∗ is an equilibrium
and it is Pareto efficient among all possible equilibria.
Theorem 3.15 Let us suppose that market demand in each period is a con-
tinuous function, that each supplier production set Kij is a compact set, that
limq→1+ D
−1
t (q) = +∞ for all t and that Cij(q) is of class C1(K˙ij). If we
24
can partition the time horizon T in r intervals, T =
⋃r
t=1 Ti (r can also be
1) and in each of these periods it exist a single firm such that it can prof-
itably (i.e., the firm can recover its time horizon fixed cost in period Ts at the
market prices ) supply (q1s, q2s, . . . , qns) such that pts = D−1ts (qts) is greater
than partial marginal costs then a solution to problem P
′′
will exists.
Proof. The hypothesis guarantee that the feasible region is non empty.
For example, the existence in each period Ts of a firm that can profitably
supply the market at prices above marginal cost is guaranteed if there exists
a technology js with no minimum load requirement. In this case in fact we
can solve the following problems:
Max CTj (q1, . . . , qt)
s.t.
q ∈ Kj
Since CTj is continuous and Kj is compact a solution exists. Let us call it
C∗j . Then we will solve the problems for all t = {1, . . . ts}
Max
∂Cj
∂qt
(q)
s.t.
q ∈ Kj
Again, since partial derivatives are continuous and Kj is compact, a solution
will exists. Let us call (p∗1, . . . , p∗ts) these solutions and let p
∗
v = max{p∗t }.
Set p∗v = max{p∗v, C∗j }. Consider then q∗t = Dt(p∗t ). If q∗t ∈ Ktj for all
t we are done since p∗q∗ ≥ C∗j . Otherwise it is enough to rise the prices
to curtail demand until a feasible solution is obtained. Analogous to the
proof of Theorem (3.6) we can bound the prices in each market to obtain a
bounded feasible set. For each possible combination of active or non active
firms the objective function is continuous and the feasible set is either empty
or non empty and compact. In this latter case the maximum will exist and
since the number of possible combination is finite the result follows.
When variable costs are separable in the number of periods the problem is
simpler and the obvious modifications are left to the reader. Note that, since
we have indexed each production set by period t as well as each quantity
qtij we can use exactly the same framework to find equilibrium prices in T
25
markets for T different products with independent demand and that can be
supplied by the same firm at cost CT (q1, . . . , qT ), both in the single period
and in the multi period setting.
4 Equilibria with Inelastic Demand
In this section we would address the case in which demand D is inelas-
tic. This means that consumers do not have a well defined set of strate-
gies. Would we know each consumer budget and each consumer demand,
we could, at most, compute an implicit price cap as p = min{Bidi }. Hence,
for all prices less than p each supplier strategy set will be equal to the sin-
gleton {di}. At higher prices some supplier strategy set will be empty and
the problem will not be well defined since the demand can not be D any
longer. In general, though, in real applications we do not have this informa-
tion. However, assuming large enough consumers budgets, we may say that
consumers surplus is maximized at the minimum price at which all demand
can be satisfied. On the other hand, producers need to maximize profits so
that the welfare function reduces to a min cost allocation of demand. We
could, hence, use problem P
′′
introduced in the previous section in which
the objective function is simplified. Let us call this problem P
′′
inl.
Min
T∑
t=1
ptDt +
k∑
i=1
nk∑
j=1
CVij (q1ij , . . . , qT ij) + C
F
ijZij + 
T∑
t=1
k∑
i=1
nk∑
j=1
ztij
s.t.
Dt =
k∑
i=1
ni∑
j=1
qtij ∀ t = {1, . . . , T} (26)
qtij ∈ Kti ∀ t, i, j (27)
qtij ≤ Mztij ∀ t, i, j (28)
(pt − ∂Cij
∂qtij
(q1ij , . . . , qT ij))(qtij − ltij)ztij ≥ 0 ∀ t, i, j (29)
(ptltij − CV (.., ltij , ., ) + CV (, ..0, ., ))ztij ≥ (qtij − ltij)Negztij ∀ t, i, j(30)
T∑
t=1
(ptqtij − CVtij(qtij)− CFijZij ≥ 0 ∀ i, j (31)
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T∑
t=1
ztij ≤ MZij ∀ i, j (32)
ztij ∈ {0, 1} ∀ t, i, j (33)
Zij ∈ {0, 1} ∀ i, j (34)
pt ≥ 0 ∀ t = {1, . . . , T} (35)
When we have a single period, a producer will offer a quantity q if and only
if the market price is higher than both the marginal cost and the average
total cost at q. The above optimization problem has a solution if total
capacity is greater or equal to demand in each period and producers do
not have minimum load requirement. Since we are assuming free entrance
the condition is basically equivalent to a no minimum load requirement for
at least one technology. In the case of minimum load constraints for all
technologies a solution may fail to exist so that existence is contingent to
the specific instance of the problem. This is summarized in the following:
Lemma 4.1 If
∑k
i=1
∑ni
j=1Mtij ≥ Dt for all t = {1, . . . , T}, where Mtij =
max{Ktij}, and ltij = 0 for all t, i, j then problem P ′′inl has a solution. If ∀ t
∃ kt such that nktMtk ≥ Dt and lkt = 0 then problem P
′′
inl has a solution.
Under the usual assumptions on suppliers cost functions we also have that
each supplier is maximizing profit over the set of its available strategies,
given other players actions.
Lemma 4.2 Under the assumption of Lemma (3.13), if a solution to prob-
lem P
′′
inl exists, then it is an equilibrium and it is second best Pareto efficient
among all possible equilibria.
Let us call P
′′′
inl the problem obtained from P
′′
inl by removing the profitability
constraint.
Corollary 4.3 Under the assumption of Lemma (3.13), if a solution to
problem P
′′′
inl exists then it is an equilibrium and it is Pareto efficient among
all possible equilibria.
5 Efficient Energy-Only Markets
In this section we will first apply our findings to numerical examples taken
from the literature, and then we will sketch an efficient energy-only market
design able to restore incentives for the investors.
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We will start with a very simple example from O’ Neill et al., [28]. They
consider a single commodity market in which all firms have the same cost
structure and there are no barrier to entry. Basically, they are considering
a single technology and a large number of equal firms within it. Each firm
must incur a fixed cost of 1 to produce any positive amount in the range
(0, 1] while marginal cost is zero. The market demand curve is known and
it is p = 2 − 0.6Q. They claim that in this economy there can not be any
market equilibrium. Their reasoning is as follow: ” For any price less than
1, no firm will produce and there will be a shortage. For any price strictly
greater than 1, quantity supplied is infinite and there is a surplus. Finally,
for p = 1, quantity demanded is 1.67 but the quantity supplied will be no
more than 1, because if a second firm enters, it will not earn enough revenue
to cover its fixed cost”. Here, the trick to solve the problem is to realize
that in a competitive market there is always an optimal number of firms to
satisfy efficiently a given demand. In fact, the firm criterion to enter a given
market is not just ”positive extra-profits” but ”positive extra-profits high
enough” to cover its own investment costs. Note also that this is a necessary
but not sufficient condition. In this example it happens that the optimal
number of firm is just one, i.e., the level of demand and the technology
cost structure characterize a natural monopoly. If we apply our modified
Tatonnement process we get that for prices less than one no firm will supply,
at price 1 all firms supply set will be the singleton 1, i.e., firms will produce
an amount equal to 1 or will not produce at all since otherwise they would
not cover their investment cost. But the quantity demanded by the market
at price 1 is only 1.6666 so that at this price there can not be any match
between demand and supply. Hence, the auctioneer increases the price, let
say to 1.1. The market demand is now 1.5 but each firm will supply only
in the interval [0.91, 1] so that again there can be no match between supply
and demand. Similarly, if the price is, let say 1.32, the market demand is
1.1333 and each firm will supply anything within the interval [0.7575, 1] and
again no match is possible. When the price is raised each firm supply set
will enlarge while market demand will decrease. Finally when the price is
1.4 the market demand is 1 and each firm supply set is [0.7142, 1]. Now
a match is possible with one single firm supplying all the market. If we
increase the price we see that the welfare function decreases so that the
price 1.4 is the equilibrium price. Note also that this is the price that a
monopolist will choose to maximize its own profit. The extra-profit earned
by this single firm is not high enough to support a new entrant and the
market is in equilibrium.
We proceed with another example from Scarf, [31], reported also in [28].
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There are two technologies, Smokestack and High Tech. The first has large
capacity, is moderately inexpensive to construct per unit of capacity and has
fairly high marginal cost of production. The second technology has medium
capacity, is expensive to set up for unit of capacity but has lower marginal
cost of production. Data are summarized in table 1.
Table 1: Smokestack versus High Tech
Smokestack High Tech
Capacity 16 7
Construction Cost 53 30
Marginal Cost 3 2
Average Cost at Capacity 6.3125 6.2857
Suppose that we want to satisfy an inelastic demand of 61. The optimal
mix of technologies and firms within each technology will be to construct 3
Smokestack plants and 2 High Tech plants, all running at capacity except
for one of the Smokestack plant producing 15 units. Equivalently, we can
have the same mix and the same cost with Smokestack plants all producing
15.6667. This is the usual assumption when we talk of equal firms within
the same technology: they will produce the same output. If we solve prob-
lem P
′′
inl with this data we get that the equilibrium price is (about) 6.3830.
At this price Smokestack plants will earn zero profits while the more effi-
cient technology will earn the difference between the market price and its
own average total cost at capacity (times the capacity, i.e., the amount pro-
duced). We will call these profits ”infra rents”, following Joskow, [24]. In
this case they are quite low, i.e., 0.6808 for each high tech plant or 1.3617 for
the High Tech technology as a whole. Hence, with the proposed approach,
we do find the expected economics dynamic, found in any microeconomics
textbook: marginal technology earning zero profit and more efficient tech-
nologies earning infra rents.
Our last example is more targeted towards the energy industry and is taken
from Joskow, [24]. There are three hypothetical electric generating technolo-
gies with different capital cost to operating cost ratios and a hypothetical
load duration curve representing the number of hours during the year the
aggregate system demand or ”load” reaches any particular demand level.
Demand is at least 10, 000Mw for the entire year (8760 hours) and reaches
a peak of 22, 000Mw in just one instant. Demand between these two values
is reached according to the following load duration curve
D = 22, 000− 1.37H
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where H represents the number of hours system load reaches a level D. In
table 2 we summarize the cost data.
Table 2: Production Costs of Generating Technologies
Generation Annualized Capital Costs Operating Costs
Technology ($/Mw/Year) ($/Mw/Hour)
Base Load 240,000$ 20$
Intermediate 160,000$ 35$
Peaking 80,000$ 80$
The least cost mix of generating technologies, the number of hours in which
each technology is marginal, total cost and total revenues by pricing at
marginal costs are displayed in table 3
Table 3: Least Cost Mix of Technologies
Generation Capacity Marginal Tot. Cost Tot. Revenues
Technology Hours
Base Load 14,694 5333-8760 5,940,379,300 $ 4,765,153,180$
Intermediate 4,871 1778-5333 1,385,604,660$ 995,973,370$
Peaking 2,435 1-1778 367,977,200$ 173,177,200$
Total 22,000 7,693,961,160$ 5,934,303,750$
Hence, by pricing at marginal cost none of the technologies is able to recover
total cost and the shortfall is exactly 80, 000$Mw has predicted by theory,
[7]. If we apply our pricing model to this optimal mix we find that price is
equal to marginal cost for the entire year except for one hour a year, i.e., at
peak load, when it needs to raise to 80, 085.6356$ in order for all technologies
to break even. Note that the price we find, namely 80, 085.6356$, is slightly
higher than the Ramsey-Boiteux price of 80, 080$ since we are applying this
price for an hour in which demand is not always at 22, 000 but between
21, 999 and 22, 000. We will have anyway that the marginal technology will
be making zero profit while the more efficient technologies will be earning
infra rents. They are anyway quite low, specifically 376, 690$ for the base
load, corresponding to 0.006% of its total cost, and 76, 161$ for the interme-
diate, corresponding to 0.005% of its total cost. If we had more peak load
during the year the peak load price would decrease. For example, with the
same mix of technologies, if we had 2 hours during the year in which demand
were between 21, 999 and 22, 000 the peak load price would be 40, 075$ and
the marginal technology would be the intermediate, earning 0 profits, while
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the base load would earn 146, 940$, a 0, 0025% infra rent, and the peaking
would earn 59, 335$, a 0, 016% infra rent. Hence, knowing the number of
time the system is at peak is important. We could also spread the peak
load period, to get lower prices that are at trade off, though, with total cost
and hence are ”inefficient”. Still, there can be other type of ”valuation”:
political, social, psychological, etc., which would call for ”inefficient” but
lower prices. We could make an analogy with debt installments, in which
a buyer is willing to pay overall more in order to have a lower installment
value. In table 4 we report different length for the peak load period, the
corresponding prices and the infra rents ( and extra-profits) for the efficient
technologies.
Table 4: Peak Load Period Length versus Price
Demand Peak Period Peak Price Base Load Intermediate Peaker
cut off (hours) (Mwh) Profits Profits Profits
21,999 1 80,085.6356 $ 376,690 $ 76,161 $ 0 $
21,972.05 20.4 4,024.21326 $ 7,081,781 $ 2,298,871 $ 0 $
21,178.06 600 240.419537 $ 239,096,686 $ 79,210,849 $ 0 $
21,041,07 700 222. 320645 $ 288,655,570 $ 95,639,413 $ 0 $
20,934.22 778 211.650134 $ 329,789,260 $ 109,275,061 $ 0 $
These results would sustain the view of those who are contrary to price caps
or of those who sustain electrical systems should be a regulated monopoly.
For example, a regulated monopoly could still price in such a way that each
generating unit is able to recover its own costs from its own revenues (hence,
getting the right price signals and avoid stranded costs), spreading the peak
to get lower prices for customers and to use extra-profits for base research
on sustainable energies or to give it entirely back to customers. This is
probably just a matter of political taste and it is of no concern to us.
Next, we will present a very simple, energy-only market design that price at
peak load and, hence, it is able to recover fixed costs.
• Every year the market maker will forecast yearly demand, (or for some
period T into the future) and will ask generators, existing and incum-
bent, to bid for this demand both their (expected) variable cost and
the fixed cost that they need to recover within the year (period).
• The market maker will solve problem P ′′ or P ′′inl (depending on the
demand elasticity) to get the expected peak load price and above all to
determine the fixed cost that each technology needs to recover within
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the period. The technology fixed cost is computed by gathering to-
gether similar firms who have been selected in the optimization pro-
gram to supply and summing their bid fixed cost. Any ties will be
broken by selecting existing versus incumbent generation, i.e., given
the same bid, priority will be given to existing generation in the selec-
tion process. This is to give potential new entrants the right signals.
• Once this yearly auction is over and the market maker has the proper
information the day ahead energy market will proceed as usual, with
the market maker receiving bid and ask and matching supply and
demand to clear the market. The market maker will solve problem
P
′′
(or P
′′
inl) where, though, the profitability constraint, (21), has been
removed along with the fixed cost in the objective function. Hence,
we just have producers bidding, for each price, supply sets made of
all quantities whose marginal cost is below or equal to the cried price.
Basically, this turn to be pricing at marginal cost. While the day-ahead
market clears every day, the market maker will compute infra-rents
which accrue to the efficient technologies and will adjust consequently
the fixed cost that each technology has to recover. Hence, fixed cost
for each technology is a function of time, Fi(t) and can only decrease.
• When the system is at peak load at any time t the market maker
will compute the peak load price based on Fi(t) and on the expected
number of peaks during the remaining period.
At the end of the year (period) the proposed system guarantees that tech-
nologies have recovered, through infra-rents or peak load prices, the fixed
costs determined in the auction. It is important to realize that this sort of
auction is not a forward market since selected suppliers are not given any
contract nor are they sure to be selected to supply during the year. This
process is needed to get cost information from generation and to allow in-
cumbents to have the right signals as to what type of technology and capacity
is really needed by the system. Hence, the auction is not taking away the
normal business risk! Existing generation has not incentives to lower fixed
cost bids as a deterrent for incumbents since then the peak load price set by
the system operator would not cover their true costs. They might, though,
bid higher. In a true competitive system this behavior should be offset by
incumbent bids. However, in order to prevent possible gaming, the market
maker could set caps based on its knowledge of the cost of each technology
capacity (again, here the assumption of perfect information!). Gathering
this type of cost information is usually easier than gathering information
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about V OLL (Value of Lost Load) as many proposed scheme in the litera-
ture require. Also, since the proposed day ahead market is basically based
on the classical theory of marginal cost pricing, there is no need to modify
the way existing day-ahead market work. Hence, applying this scheme to
existing market is not very costly since, furthermore, the yearly auction does
not require any contract signing or exchange of money but just an exchange
of information. It is just a way to gather private information and make it
public. We would discuss at length pros and cons of such a system, taking
into consideration system constraints, in our forthcoming paper.
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